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Since 1984, Turkish Kurds, led in large part by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), have been waging a bitter guerrilla war for a separate identity within Turkey. The PKK has been arguably misunderstood as having a purely Marxist- Leninist agenda; its more accurate character is militant nationalism. A new phase of bloody clashes between the PKK and Turkish soldiers began following the end of the Gulf War in 1991. In the present year, the war continues to gather more intensity. The Kurdish guerrillas are fighting for an independent homeland in southeastern Turkey for nearly 12 million people. The persistent Kurdish serhildan (uprising) is pushing the issues of national identity and human rights in Turkey toward a greater discussion in the global political arena, despite the intent of Western powers (largely the enemies of Iraq) to minimize the impact on international politics. In Turkey, as in Iraq, Kurds are in conflict with a government that rules them but cannot claim their loyalty.
From the period of the Iran-Iraq War, in the late 1980s, until 1992, serious international attention focused upon the Kurds had been almost exclusive to the situation in Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq War years and shortly thereafter, Iraqi forces committed gross atrocities (including poison gas attacks) upon Iraqi Kurdish civilians who took sides with Iran, while the world community sat inert and almost completely silent. Then, during the Gulf War, the United States (virtually directing the "international coalition" against Iraq) enlisted the Kurds against Saddam Hussein and incited them to attack Iraqi forces. But directly following the war, Hussein took revenge against those Kurdish rebels, whom the coalition abandoned for several tragic months in which thousands died. This betrayal was reminiscent of a similar incident which took place in 1975. Then, the United States also instigated a Kurdish rebellion, which it abandoned to decimation by Hussein's forces when an abrupt change in policy was dictated by competing "national interests" of the United States in other countries, Iran and Israel.
Apparently embarrassed by the fact that the world remembered those events of 1975, and also due to the desire to keep Hussein from reconsolidating his former power (while paradoxically preserving the integrity of Iraq as the only regional force which can oppose a resurgent, fundamentalist Iran, but then, only with someone as strong as Hussein in control), the United States and company imposed a relatively protected zone, north of the 36th parallel in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi aircraft are prevented from flying into the zone to stage air attacks, but ground forces continue to threaten and blockade the Kurds. Thus, today there is some limited autonomy for Iraqi Kurds, but the future of this situation is far from certain. This is in part because the Kurds are divided among several competing political factions, but also because events elsewhere, particularly in Turkey, may eventually determine once more that the Kurds are generally expendable.
In Iraq, the situation for Kurds is extremely complicated. Of many Kurdish factions, there are two which dominate. Mas'ud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stands for achieving an agreement with Hussein which would guarantee a minimal version of autonomy in which Kurds could administer affairs in their own cities and communities, but would conform to rules and laws set by the Iraqi Government. In contrast, Mustapha Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) stands for striking deals with Hussein's enemies (presently Turkey's President Ozal) who might help to create Kurdish autonomy by maintaining a credible threat to intervene against Iraqi repression of the Kurds. Both organizations have differences with the violent revolutionary philosophy and strategy of the PKK (of Turkey), especially because it aspires to create a greater Kurdish nation around its own agenda (which would dominate others), and also because the PKK has thrust Iraqi Kurds once more into the line of fire by taking refuge from Turkey in Iraq.
In 1991, following the Gulf War, thousands of Turkish Kurds, under attack
by Ozal's forces, fled to the mountain sanctu
aries of Iraqi Kurdistan protected by the United States. From there, PKK
guerrillas descended into the Kurdish heartland in southeastern Turkey, attacking
government buildings and barracks across the region. Then, in August 1992, PKK
rebel forces engaged in more bloody fighting against Turkish troops; in one battle,
27 Turkish soldiers and 36 Kurdish rebels were killed. In retaliation, Turkish
aircraft staged air strikes against the bases in northern Iraq, in one case
bombarding two PKK camps five miles from Turkey's borders. Although the United States
would have shot down these planes if they had been Hussein's, nothing was done to
prevent Turkey from killing Kurds within Iraq. Thus, in visible contradiction to the
protection provided for Iraqi Kurds, issues of Kurdish identity and basic human rights
in Turkey have not been taken into serious or equal consideration. In fact, the
West has refused to intervene on behalf of Turkey's Kurds, insisting that the issue
is an "internal affair" for Turkey to
resolve in its own way. This reflects a clear
double standard of Western foreign policy pertaining to violations of human rights.
Turkey, a NATO member, was an ally of the West during the Cold War days (permitting the installation of nuclear-armed missiles on the border of the Soviet Union and providing bases for Western forces). Turkey remained neutral in the Arab-Israeli wars (while maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel) and was a major ally against Hussein during the Gulf War. The trade-off for this alliance has been the indulgence of Turkey's repression of Kurds, which reflects the low importance of universal human rights standards in relation to geopolitical interests. The scant attention paid to the rights of Turkish Kurds also demonstrates that Kurdish self-determination is not ultimately important to either the United States or other Western states. Turkey is not only allowed but even encouraged to repress Kurds in the luxury of complaisant international silence.
However, this conspiracy of silence in reporting events in Turkey has not allowed it to escape from the ignominious fact of being the one country where Kurds have the fewest rights (fewer, in fact, than in Iraq). For example, while Kurds are at least recognized as distinct from Iraqis, Turkey has refused to acknowledge that Kurds even exist. The Turkish penal code (formulated in 1938) was used extensively, until very recently, to suppress the free speech and political activity of Kurds. Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code prohibited the formation of "separatist" organizations and the dissemination of separatist ideas. Articles 158 and 159 prohibited insulting the Turkish president, the Parliament, the government, and the military authorities. Even lawyers who defended Kurds accused of promoting separatism have not been immune from prosecution. For example, Huseyin Yildirim, a Kurdish lawyer who represented PKK defendants, was arrested by the military in October 1980 and held in the notorious military prison at Diyarbakir (where Kurds are the majority of the incarcerated) until July 1982, during which time he was physically tortured under degrading conditions simply because he refused to stop defending his clients in court.
Fourth World Bulletin • February 1993
Copyright © 1996 by the Fourth World Center
Created by Aigis Communications, Ltd