Reasons for the failure of the union included the Senegalese military intervention in Gambian initiatives, Gambia's abiding fear of unfair trade and price policy with Senegal, and a major impasse concerning a plan to build a bridge across the Gambia River. There was also a dilemma over currency, as Senegal's CFA was stable but tied to the French franc, while Gambia's dalasi was more uncertain, sometimes floating, though cheaper to trade with. Perhaps the most important issue was personality: President Diouf wanted to be president of the new union and refused to relinguish that position to President Jawara, so Jawara and Gambia together opted for exit.

The divorce was disadvantageous for the Casamançais, who would have preferred to conduct their trade out of Banjul, rather than Dakar, which is farther away and so presents increased transportation costs and difficulties. In fact, there existed a basic common bond between the Casamançais and Gambians, both of whom had experienced domination by the state of Senegal. The breakdown of the Senegambia union exacerbated the economic conditions of Casamance, especially due to the transportation barriers. Since there is no bridge across the Gambia River, goods being transported from the Casamance to Dakar must go by ferry (often necessitating a one-to-three day wait) or go around the river, doubling the mileage. To develop their own economy, the Casamançais need either a major port, or improved linkage with Gambia to facilitate trade out of Banjul, or a bridge. The government in Dakar apparently has chosen to ignore these needs.

The first proclamation of independence in the Casamance was made in 1947 by the then newly-formed Movement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces of the CasamanceMFDC). The MFDC had its roots and main constituency in the Diola communities who comprise the largest indigenous population in the region. Although all the peoples of the Casamance shared a common history (of European colonialism) and had a common dilemma in dealing with exploitation within the Senegalese state, it was largely the Diola people who felt the need to mobilize and resist.

Although Diolas might have felt jealous resentment toward the Wolofs who control the state, their main issue has been grounded in political and economic realities, not in "ethnic" animosities, although the issues overlap. Diolas have complained that Serers, Toucouleurs and Wolof Muslims were allocated land for peanut farming, at the expense of the Diola economy. Such issues also have overlapped with broader questions like whether "democracy" is truly available within a society in which inevitably outvoted minorities rarely feel in control of their own destinies. In reflection of the situation, President Diouf (a Wolof) has allegedly said that stopping the Diolas would solve the separatist problem of the Casamance.

The current phase of rebellion officially began in 1982, when the MFDC led a peaceful march to express their demand for independence. The government responded with arrests. After that, state repression became savage and uncompromising. In May 1990, Amnesty International made allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Casamançais. President Diouf refused to investigate those charges, but in May 1991, he signed a peace agreement with the MFDC, and in June, he granted amnesty for all those (about 400) who were on or awaiting trial for rebellion. The peace agreement was ineffective; violence in the Casamance increased after it was signed.

The movement divided into two factions in August 1992: Front Sud (Southern Front), led by Abbe Diamacoune, became primarily a Diola organization fighting for secession and full independence; Front Nord (Northern Front), led by Sidy Badji, formed as an alliance of several peoples (Diola and non-Diola) who were willing to settle for something less than independence and to negotiate under the terms of the 1991 agreement.

Diola predominance of Front Sud has caused tension, especially among Front Nord people who have worried about the loss of multi-cultural identity and have wondered if the region will end up divided along lines of cultural distinction. Political differences have resulted from a lack of agreement on how far the movement should go, not on its basic goals, which remain the rights of the Casamançais to choose their own leaders, promote their respective cultures, define their own policy of investment, and control their own resources.

In 1992, the region was crippled by the flight of thousands of people from frequent random violence in the province. The refugees, including workers from the north employed in Casamance fish canneries, investors, tourists, employees of development projects and loan agencies, and ordinary citizens, fled to neighboring Guinea-Bissau (12,000 as of December 1992) and Gambia (5000 since January 1992). In December 1992, the government responded by organizing a "committee of reflection" to study the problems in the region and propose solutions.

The "committee of reflection" proposed more autonomy for the region and more decentralization, but denied the independence demanded by the Front Sud. The committee also proposed creating a regional assembly to guarantee that the situation would receive "special attention." These were the most superficial and condescending of ideas and gestures. Even the more moderate Front Nord faction felt no real effort was being been made toward compromise. Diouf did not need to compromise, however, as he had his army, while neither faction of the MFDC had any substantial military resources.

In January, with the presidential elections approaching, the Front Sud declared its opposition to elections being held in the Casamance with expanded fighting. Diouf recalled 1500 soldiers from their "peace-keeping" duties in Liberia and sent them to Casamance, for reasons of "internal security." Then, with the national elections only 3 weeks away, intense fighting broke out between Front Sud guerrillas and Senegalese army troops, leaving dozens dead.

Meanwhile, the state-controlled daily Le Soleil maintained silence on the issue, apparently to avoid threatening Senegal's reputation in the international community as a democratic and stable state and to keep the population ignorant. The main opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, however, stated prior to the elections that if the government did not take the situation in the Casamance seriously, it would explode into a civil war. Diouf supporters were furious, calling his words incitement for war.

In early February, President Diouf went to the Casamance to campaign. Many people had fled the area, however, and the president's advisers worried about a low turnout in the elections. Diouf's main theme during this part of the campaign was to promote "national security," as he came protected by a huge military convoy. Whatever his pretenses, most people were not comforted or feeling protected by the military. Rather, they were living in constant fear, a real state of war. When Diouf tried to express a certain "sympathy" for the MFDC, people asked why he had not made such efforts months earlier.

Fourth World Bulletin • December 1993

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