The MFDC was not the least bit impressed by Diouf's grandstanding. In fact, Front Sud gave no support to any of the presidential candidates. Many rebels had lost all their material possessions during the fighting but did not want to stop because they believed that they would better their lot through the achievement of independence. The situation had gone too far; they had nothing left but their arms and hope. Diouf's strategy was to try to use the carrot and the stick at the same time, promising food aid and negotiations with Front Sud, while threatening violent retaliation for refusal to cooperate.

As election day approached, the Casamance was tense. On February 19 and 20, the MFDC attacked a military site and a public transport vehicle. On election day, a vehicle carrying Parti Socialist militants hit a mine, leaving 20 people dead. Those who were working in polling booths for the presidential elections said they wanted no part in the legislative elections in May. When results came in, the government estimated that 40% of the voters had participated in Ziguinchor, and 44% in Kolda, but the independent press denounced those figures as fictitious. Not only had the numbers been tampered with, but curiously a huge percentage of the votes had gone to Diouf. Evidence of fraud was difficult to refute.

Following Diouf's "victory," Sidy Badji, of Front Nord, living under protection of the Senegalese military, promised to negotiate as soon as MFDC could solve its internal problems. His stated objectives were to restore peace so that tourists would come back, hotels would re-open, and the Casamance could be "reborn" economically. Front Sud leader Diamacoune was saying, in contrast, that the war had only led to misery and desolation. Others meanwhile speculated that it had been only splinter groups which were to blame for the violence. The state, however, was grasping at straws, showing its desperation by refusing to relinquish control over the territory and resources, while promising more autonomy to the region.

On July 8,1993, a ceasefire was signed between the MFDC and the government, in the hope that it would end the conflict which in the last year has taken over 300 lives and resulted in the flight from the region of over 30,000 refugees. For the ceasefire to result in sustained peace, the government will have to demonstrate that it intends to satisfy the complaints from the Casamançias which it has heretofore refused to address.

The present calm is not necessarily an end nor does it represent a solution. Diouf has succeeded in putting a lid on rebel activity by stepping up military control, but the reality is that he and Senegal still have a lot to lose. The country has a reputation for being a model for democracy in Africa, for enforcing liberal economic policies and cooperating with the IMF and the World Bank, and for being a "peaceful" country. To expect to keep a permanent lid on dissatisfaction in the Casamance without addressing the real issues would be pure folly.

Fourth World Bulletin • December 1993

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