Jerome Bruner argues that the human sciences have lost sight of the original intent of the Cognitive Revolution begun in the 1950s. To him, the revolution was Ran all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychology---not stimuli and responses, not overtly observable behavior, not biological drives and their transformation, but meaningS (p.2). While not addressing the role of the computer in how this original goal became Rfractionated and technicalizedS (p. 4), Bruner claims that the Remphasis began shifting from TmeaningU to Tinformation,U from the _construction_ of meaning to the _processing_ of informationS (p. 4) and that computation became the ruling metaphor for cognition.

In place of information processing, Bruner offers Rto construct a mental science around the concept of meaning and the processes by which meanings are created and negotiated within a communityS (p. 11). For Bruner, an understanding of mind must include Rmental states like believing, desiring, intending, grasping a meaning,S (p. 8) and must consider the mediating effects of culture and language. Scientists should not continue studying cognition in isolation, because Rthe symbolic systems that individuals used in constructing meaning were systems that were already in place, already Tthere,U deeply entrenched in culture and language. They constituted a very special kind of communal tool kit whose tools, once used, made the user a reflection of the communityS (p. 11).

Although his acceptance of the social or situated construction of meaning raises the issue of relativism, BrunerUs approach is not relativism. Rather, Rit concerns open-mindedness, . . . a willingness to construe knowledge and values from multiple perspectives without loss of commitment to oneUs own values. . . It asks that we be accountable for how and what we know. But it does not insist that there is only one way of constructing meaning, or one right wayS (p. 30).

Contrasting the isolating individualistic model of mind with a folk psychology, Bruner opts for the common sense approach to understanding human intentions and agency. His cultural psychology, like folk psychology, is based on the premises that Rpeople have beliefs and desires,S (p. 39) that Rour beliefs should cohere in some way,S (p. 39) and that we understand RpersonhoodS (p. 39) to exist. A major function of folk psychology is Rthat it summarizes not simply how things are but (often implicitly)how they should beS (p. 40) He further argues that people construct their understanding of these premises through narrative.

BrunerUs analysis of narrative goes beyond the literary meaning. As a form of discourse, its Rprinciple property is its inherent sequentiality . . . of event, mental states, happenings involving human beings as characters or actors,S (p. 43) but the meaning of these constituents of narrative Ris given by their place in the overall configuration of the sequence as a whole---its plot or fabulaS (p.43). This internal structure gives meaning to the constituents, without reliance on, and sometimes in conflict with, realities external to the narrative. But the constituents also contribute to the understanding of the whole. Narrative is used to construct meaning by relating the individual or constituent aspects of human behavior to the context or situation in which the behavior occurs. One benefit of this relational aspect of narrative is Rin the forging of links between the exceptional and the ordinaryS (p. 47). A culture thrives and evolves when there are processes for including the new, the exceptional, into the traditions of the culture without destroying them. RThe viability of a culture inheres in its capacity for resolving conflicts, for explicating differences and renegotiating communal meanings . . . It is narrative and narrative interpretation upon which folk psychology depends for achieving this kind of meaningS (p. 47).

Narrative is also used by individuals to create meaning through its dramatic quality. Using BurkeUs analysis of story with its five characteristics of RActor, an Action, a Goal, a Scene, and an Instrument---plus TroubleS (p. 50), Bruner argues that narrative Rinvolves both a cultural convention and a deviation from it that is explicable in terms of an individual intentional state. This gives stories not only a moral status but an epistemic oneS (p. 51).People use narrative to schematize their experience and this is a process that is situated socially and dependent upon language use.

Language is central to BrunerUs cultural psychology and he argues for a biology of meaning that makes language acquisition an innate human ability. His literature review results in three claims about early language acquisition. First, language is acquired through active interaction with other language users; it is socially constructed. Second, Rcommunicative functions or intentions are well in place before the child has mastered the formal language for expressing them linguisticallyS (p. 71) and third, the first two are inextricably intertwined. The childUs language acquisition through social interaction progresses far better when she already Rgrasps in some _prelinguistic_ way the significance of what is being talked aboutS (p. 71) The prelinguistic ability is Ra form of social Tmeaning readinessUS (p. 73) that is developed as the child interacts non-verbally with others by pointing, grasping, use of facial expressions, etc. ROnce the child masters through interaction the appropriate prelinguistic forms for managing ostensive reference, he or she can move beyond them to operate, as it were, within the confines of language properS (p. 75).

Meaning is constructed by individuals situated in a culture that influences that construction. The process of construction is most often a form of narrative and that depends upon effective language use which is also influenced by culture. Bruner claims that any cognitive science, not just his cultural psychology, must remain sensitive to culture as well as biology. RIn the end, even the strongest causal explanations of the human condition cannot make plausible sense without being interpreted in the light of the symbolic world that constitutes human cultureS (p. 138).

This book helped me see that who we are as individuals is how we uniquely interpret our culture. Self does not have to be understood as in opposition to Other, rather it is the individual expression of others. Without the interaction between the individual and the culture, neither would have meaning.

On a more pragmatic note, I also see that a child neglected as an infant will have difficulty in language acquisition. According to BrunerUs cultural psychology, without the prelinguistic social interaction that well-tended babies experience, a neglected or abused one will not easily understand the communicative functions or intentions of language. Without the appropriate prelinguistic forms for managing ostensive reference, language is not a natural mode of expression. In many cases, children will not understand what language is for. As an elementary teacher I have observed children who use their bodies rather than language to communicate. These children push others, grab things from them, throw things, hug and touch inappropriately, but have great difficulty in verbalizing their thoughts, and usually struggle to learn to read and write.