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Communist ex-Yugoslavia provides a compelling model of the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the "national question" and the resulting contradictions that have given rise to ethno-nationalism, secessionism, and disintegration in the states of the "Second World." The essence of this approach (the "dialectic") was the postulate that the state could manipulate and support the principle of national self-determination while simultaneously suppressing nationalism as a bourgeois tendency that would and must disappear under communism. All of the major victories of Marxist-Leninists were achieved in part by manipulating "ethnic" national aspirations for the ultimate benefit of state nationalism. Lenin used the concept of national self-determination to lure Slavic, Asian, and other indigenous nations into a unified, multi-national Soviet Union. The right to national self-determination was enshrined in all three versions of the Soviet Constitution, though that right was valid only as long as the nationalities did not attempt to exercise it. Similarly, in China, Mao used anti-Japanese sentiments to fuel nationalism in order to build the socialist state there. Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and Ethiopia all followed the same pattern.
Yugoslavia was no different. Under the pre-World War II Serb-dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the underground Communists supported the right of national secession but also claimed that ethnic nationalism was a bourgeois prejudice to be overcome by socialist unity. During World War II, this approach was followed strictly by the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) which used Germany as the common enemy in order to solidify support for a supra-national union in pursuit of a socialist agenda. The YCP, emerging politically dominant after the war, recognized the power of nationalist tendencies. However, while the Yugoslav constitution elevated the rights of national republics (including the right to secede), it still created a strong centralized state which was legitimized due to the external threat of the Cold War.
Centralized control under Tito was designed, at least in rhetoric, to build a unified communist state by suppressing dominant national aspirations (Croat, Serbian, and Slovenian interests) while elevating those of the "little nations" (Bosnians, Macedonians, Hungarians, Montenegrans, and Albanians). In the long run, however, this approach did not solve the nationality problems. Serbs in particular resented this policy, which obstructed their control of a territory of which they considered themselves to be indigenous. With the breakdown of the Cold War, the diverse nations of Yugoslavia attempted to realize the ideals of self-determination and control their own destinies within the homeland that each claimed. None felt particularly bound by the Yugoslavian identity which Tito had attempted to create and impose upon them all.
Serbian nationalism was aroused first, following the failure of the "Collective Presidency" which was created after Tito's death in 1980. The Serbian movement (which attempted, first, to consolidate Yugoslavia under its own control and then, when that didn't work, to break the union apart) caused a quick counter-mobilization among Slovenes and Croats, both of which declared their independence on 26 June 1991. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav federal army immediately invaded Slovenia but withdrew after a short, destructive fight in order to turn its forces against Croatia.
The Croats lost a strategic opportunity to attack the Yugoslav army while it was engaged in Slovenia (supposedly, there had been a deal between Serb and Croat leaders to permit the troops safe passage to Slovenia in exchange for recognizing the integrity of the Croatian territory). Faced with the overwhelming might of the Yugoslav federal army supported by determined irregulars recruited among the local Serbs, the Croats had to retreat.
The Croatian strategy for the war focused on gaining international recognition of the new state rather than defeating the Serbs outright, along with presenting the Serbs as aggressors as a crucial element. The defense of such places as the martyr-city of Vukovar (which accounted for nearly one third of the total number of casualties in the whole conflict) and Dubrovnik was intended to sway world public opinion in favor of independent Croatia. However, the Western powers (except for Germany, Austria, and Hungary-all stead-fast supporters of Croatia), especially the US, continued their traditional policy of support for Yugoslav unity that had originated with support for Tito as an anti-Soviet proxy during the early days of the Cold War. Today, US State Department officials admit that an "error" was committed and that Yugoslav unity was unsalvageable by the time that the Croatian war of secession began.
Fourth World Bulletin • October 1992
Copyright © 1996 by the Fourth World Center
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