by:
Introduction: "Indians Shmindians"
TELEPHONE CALL FROM a New York editor: Mander, you've got two books out
there now; they're both selling. Are you working on anything new?
Mander: Yes.
Editor: What's the subject?
Mander: Indians.
Editor: Indians? Oh God, not Indians. Nobody wants a book about Indians.
Indians have been done in New York; they're finished. Indians shmindians.
Mander: That's the point. The Indian problem is not over. In some parts of
the world it's worse than it was here.
Editor: Indians! Mander, you're some kind of goddamn romantic. Like Brando
or somebody.
Mander: Don't worry, I'll deal with that "romantic" thing in the book.
Editor: How's your agent going to sell it? Indian books don't sell.
Mander: They said that about TV books. Anyway, Indian books do sell. Look
at Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, and look at Castaneda and Peter
Matthiessen's books. Look at Black Elk Speaks. I don't think Indians are a
passé subject at all. People do want to know about Indians. The trouble is
that people are told mainly about dead Indians. They don't get to hear
about what's going on now, or why.
Editor: What's the title?
Mander: Maybe I'll use your title.
Editor: What title is that?
Mander: Indians Shmindians. It's got a catchy paradoxical ring to it. It's
memorable, it's sensational, and it does seem to summarize our cultural
attitude.
Originally I planned to write two books. The first was to be a critique of
technological society as we know it in the United States, a kind of sequel to
Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television. Instead of concentrating on TV,
though, it would have focused on the new technological age: "the information
society," computerization, robotization, space travel, artificial intelligence,
genetics, satellite communications. This seemed timely, since these technologies
are changing our world at an astoundingly accelerating rate. Thus far, most
people view these changes as good. But are they?
That our society would tend to view new technologies favorably is understandable.
The first waves of news concerning any technical innovation are invariably
positive and optimistic. That's because, in our society, the information is
purveyed by those who stand to gain from our acceptance of it: corporations and
their retainers in the government and scientific communities. None is motivated
to report the negative sides of new technologies, so the public gets its first
insights and expectations from sources that are clearly biased.
Over time, as successive generations of idealized technical innovations are
introduced and presented at World's Fairs, in futurists' visions, and in hundreds
of billions of dollars' worth of advertising, we develop expectations of a
technological utopia here on Earth and in great domed cities in space. We begin
to equate technological evolution with evolution itself, as though the two were
equally inevitable, and virtually identical. The operating homilies become
"Progress is good," "There's no turning back," and "Technology will free humans
from disease, strife, and unremitting toil."
Debate on these subjects is inhibited by the fact that views of technology in our
society are nearly identical across the political and social spectrum. The Left
takes the same view of technology as do corporations, futurists, and the Right.
Technology, they all say, is neutral. It has no inherent politics, no inevitable
social or environmental consequences. What matters, according to this view, is
who controls technology.
I have attended dozens of conferences in the last ten years on the future of
technology. At every one, whether sponsored by government, industry, or
environmentalists or other activists, someone will address the assembly with
something like this: "There are many problems with technology and we need to
acknowledge them, but the problems are not rooted to the technologies themselves.
They are caused by the way we have chosen to use them. We can do better. We must
do better. Machines don't cause problems, people do." This is always said as if
it were an original and profound idea, when actually everyone else is saying
exactly the same thing.
As we will see, the idea that technology is neutral is itself not neutral -- it
directly serves the interests of the people who benefit from our inability to see
where the juggernaut is headed.
I only began to glimpse the problem during the 1960s when I saw how excited our
society became about the presumed potentials of television. Activists, like
everyone else, saw the technology opportunistically, and began to vie with other
segments of society for their twenty seconds on the network news. A kind of war
developed for access to this powerful new instrument that spoke pictures into the
brains of the whole population, but the outcome was predetermined. We should have
realized it was a foregone conclusion that TV technology would inevitably be
controlled by corporations, the government, and the military. Because of the
technology's geographic scale, its cost, the astounding power of its imagery, and
its ability to homogenize thought, behavior, and culture, large corporations
found television uniquely efficient for ingraining a way of life that served (and
still serves) their interests. And in times of national crisis, the government
and military find TV a perfect instrument for the centralized control of
information and consciousness. Meanwhile, all other contenders for control of the
medium have effectively fallen by the wayside.
Now we have the frenzy over computers, which, in theory, can empower individuals
and small groups and produce a new information democracy. In fact, as we will see
in Chapter 4, the issue of who benefits most from computers was already settled
when they were invented. Computers, like television, are far more valuable and
helpful to the military, to multinational corporations, to international banking,
to governments, and to institutions of surveillance and control -- all of whom
use this technology on a scale and with a speed that are beyond our imaginings --
than they ever will be to you and me.
Computers have made it possible to instantaneously move staggering amounts of
capital, information, and equipment throughout the world, giving unprecedented
power to the largest institutions on the earth. In fact, computers make these
institutions possible. Meanwhile, we use our personal computers to edit our copy
and hook into our information networks -- and believe that makes us more
powerful.
Even environmentalists have contributed to the problem by failing to effectively
criticize technical evolution despite its obvious, growing, and inherent bias
against nature. I fear that the ultimate direction of technology will become
vividly clear to us only after we have popped out of the "information age" --
which does have a kind of benevolent ring -- and realize what is at stake in the
last two big "wilderness intervention" battlegrounds: space and the genetic
structures of living creatures. From there, it's on to the "postbiological age"
of nanotechnology and robotics, whose advocates don't even pretend to care about
the natural world. They think it's silly and out of date.
This first book was intended to raise questions about whether technological
society has lived up to its advertising, and also to address some grave concerns
about its future direction. Until now we have been impotent in the face of the
juggernaut, partly because we are so unpracticed in technological criticism. We
don't really know how to assess new or existing technologies. It is apparent that
we need a new, more holistic language for examining technology, one that would
ignore the advertised claims, best-case visions, and glamorous imagery that
inundate us and systematically judge technology from alternative perspectives:
social, political, economic, spiritual, ecological, biological, military. Who
gains? Who loses? Do the new technologies serve planetary destruction or
stability? What are their health effects? Psychological effects? How do they
affect our interaction with and appreciation of nature? How do they interlock
with existing technologies? What do they make possible that could not exist
before? What is being lost? Where is it all going? Do we want that?
In the end, we can see that technological evolution is leading to something new:
a worldwide, interlocked, monolithic, technical-political web of unprecedented
negative implications.
The second book was to be a kind of continuation and update of Dee Brown's Bury
My Heart at Wounded Knee. That book impressed me tremendously when I read it
twenty years ago. In one sense it was a masterful work, detailing in excruciating
fashion US double-dealing and brutality against the Indians. But in another sense
Brown did the Indian cause a disservice by seeming to suggest that they were all
wiped out, and that now there is nothing to be done. The book put the reader
through an emotional catharsis; having read it, it was as if one had already paid
one's dues. Combined with the popular imagery from television and films, the book
helped remand Indian issues to the past.
Even liberal-minded people, concerned about issues of justice, who acknowledge
the atrocities committed on this land, tend to speak of Indian issues as
tragedies of the distant past. So ingrained is this position that when,
occasionally, non-Indians do come forward on behalf of present-day Indian causes
-- Marlon Brando, William Kunstler, Robert Redford, Kevin Costner, Jane Fonda --
they are all put into that "romantic" category. People are a bit embarrassed for
them, as if they'd stepped over some boundary of propriety. When
environmentalists such as David Brewer occasionally speak publicly about how we
should heed the philosophies of the Inuit (Eskimos), they are thought
impractical, uncool, not [?], not team players. (And when a specific issue pits
native traditions against some current environmental concern, such as fur
trapping, or subsistence sealing, or whaling, the native viewpoint is not given a
fair hearing; literary luminaries like Peter Matthiessen have also been chastised
for books on contemporary Indian issues (In the Spirit of Crazy Horse and Indian
Country), with the implication that they should return to novels and Zen
explorations.
I have had my own experiences with this. In Four Arguments I reported several
encounters with Indians as a way of revealing bias in the media. I was surprised
at the number of critics who cited those lines as foolish. Gene Youngblood, for
example, a respected radical writer on media issues, said, "Mander is so
naive.... My God, that old sixties chestnut, the Indians."
I thought that even Nelson Mandela got that treatment when he spoke about Indians
at his 1990 Oakland rally. The news reports seemed to suggest that he didn't
quite understand "our Indians."
The Indian issue is not part of the distant past. Many of the worst anti-Indian
campaigns were undertaken scarcely 80 to 100 years ago. Your great-grandparents
were already alive at the time. The Model-T Ford was on the road.
More to the point is that the assaults continue today. While the Custer period of
direct military action against Indians may be over in the United States, more
subtle though equally devastating "legalistic" manipulations continue to separate
Indians from their land and their sovereignty, as we will see from the horrible
events in Alaska, described in Chapter 16.
There are still over one and a half million Indians in the United States today.
Significant numbers of them continue to live in wilderness and desert regions and
in the far north of Alaska, often engaging in traditional subsistence practices
on the same lands where their ancestors lived for millennia. Contrary to popular
assumptions, most of these Indians are not eager to become Americans, despite the
economic, cultural, and legal pressures to do so.
Elsewhere in the world, millions of native peoples also live in a traditional
manner, while suffering varying degrees of impact from the expansion of Western
technological society. In places such as Indonesia, Borneo, New Guinea, the
Amazon forests, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, parts of central Africa, the
north of Canada, and even Scandinavia, the Soviet Union, China, and Tibet, tribal
peoples are struggling to defend their ancestral lands. In other places, such as
India, Iraq, Turkey, Mexico, Chile, the Pacific islands, New Zealand, and
Australia, millions more native peoples live a kind of in-between existence,
while they are under cultural, economic, or military siege.
According to Cultural Survival, the Boston-based human rights organization, there
are at least 3,000 native nations in the world today that continue to function
within the boundaries of the 200-odd countries that assert sovereignty over them.
Many wars that our media describe as "civil wars" or "guerrilla insurgencies" are
actually attempts by tribal nations to free themselves of the domination of
larger nation-states. In Guatemala, it's the Mayans. In Burma, it's the Karens.
In the Amazon, it's the Yano-mamo and the Xingu, among others. In Micronesia,
it's the Belauans. In Indonesia, it's the peoples of Irian Jaya.
Perhaps the most painful realization for Americans is that in many of these
foreign locales --particularly South America, the Pacific islands, Indonesia, and
the Philippines -- the natives' struggles to maintain their lands and sovereignty
is often directed against United States corporations, or technology, or military.
More to the point, it is directed against a mentality, and an approach to the
planet and to the human place on Earth, that native people find fatally flawed.
For all the centuries they've been in contact with us, they've been saying that
our outlook is missing something. But we have ignored what they say. To have
heeded them would have meant stopping what we were doing and seeking another
path. It is this very difference in world views that has made the assault on
Indian people inevitable.
While planning to write these two books, however, it became apparent to me that
their subjects were inseparable. They belonged together as one book. There is no
way to understand the situation of Indians, Eskimos, Aborigines, island peoples,
or other native societies without understanding the outside societies that act
upon them. And there is no way to understand the outside societies without
understanding their relationships to native peoples and to nature itself.
All things considered, it may be the central assumption of technological society
that there is virtue in overpowering nature and native peoples. The Indian
problem today, as it always has been, is directly related to the needs of
technological societies to find and obtain remotely located resources, in order
to fuel an incessant and intrinsic demand for growth and technological
fulfillment. The process began in our country hundreds of years ago when we
wanted land and gold. Today it continues because we want coal, oil, uranium,
fish, and more land. As we survey the rest of the world -- whether it is the
Canadian Arctic, the Borneo jungle, or the Brazilian rainforest --the same
interaction is taking place for the same reasons, often involving the same
institutions.
All of these acts were and are made possible by one fundamental rationalization:
that our society represents the ultimate expression of evolution, its final
flowering. It is this attitude, and its corresponding belief that native
societies represent an earlier, lower form on the evolutionary ladder, upon which
we occupy the highest rung, that seem to unify all modern political perspectives:
Right, Left, Capitalist, and Marxist.
Save for such nascent movements as bioregionalism and Green politics, which have
at least questioned the assumptions underlying this attitude, most people in
Western society are in agreement about our common superiority. So it becomes okay
to humiliate -- to find insignificant and thus subject to sacrifice -- any way of
life or way of thinking that stands in the way of a kind of "progress" we have
invented, which is scarcely a century old. In fact, having assumed such
superiority, it becomes more than acceptable for us to bulldoze nature and native
societies. To do so actually becomes desirable, inevitable, and possibly
"divine."
But the assertion that technological society is something higher than what came
before, and that it is bound to bring us a better world, has lately fallen open
to grave doubts. The Industrial Revolution is about a century old, and we have
had ample time to draw a few conclusions about how it is going. It is not too
soon to observe that this revolution may not be living up to its advertising, at
least in terms of human contentment, fulfillment, health, sanity, and peace. And
it is surely creating terrible and possibly catastrophic impacts on the earth.
Technotopia seems already to have failed, but meanwhile it continues to lurch
forward, expanding its reach and becoming more arrogant and dangerous.
The next questions become: Can we expect the situation to improve or worsen in
the future? And what of the people who always told us that this way could not
work, and continue to say so now? Finally, which is the more "romantic"
viewpoint: that technology will fix itself and lead us to paradise, or that the
answer is something simpler?
JERRY MANDER
In the Absence of the Sacred (Introduction). San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991, 1-7.