Since the authors' goal is to expand and generalize theories, they need to start with a good theory base-which they did. There are sixteen references from both the management and the social sciences literature, which cover the field as well as possible, given the 1970 time frame. All authors and sources of key concepts are cited, and the review is well organized around two historical key issues: resistance to change and the nature of organizational change. Needless to say, Rogers' Diffusion of Innovations (1983) was written thirteen years later--the same year as A Nation at Risk indicated that there was a need for top-down, large-scale, government intervention. Bottom-up change models such as school restructuring and site-based management also date from the 1980's.

Concerning site selection and sampling, the authors state, "[an] opportunity to conduct such a case study arose in the summer of 1966 (p. 694). Thus, we are dealing with a sample of opportunity, not a reasoned, conscious selection of the unit of analysis. The school contained nearly 200 pupils and eleven full-time teachers, and was located in an urban, east-coast city. It had a large federal grant from the Board of Education's Bureau for Educational Change to develop and test new programs that were designed to improve means of educating at-risk students. The Bureau appointed an external change agent--an educational specialist--to become Director of the school as well as the originator of the innovation.

The authors state that the school contained a very positive external and internal climate for educational change, with buy-in by parents and higher administration officials, new types of instructional materials, and a 15% salary increase as an incentive to compensate teachers for the additional time and energy they would spend. They do not say how they obtained this information. Thus, this case fulfilled the authors' ground rule, namely, they wanted to study an organization in which the administration and key stakeholders actually welcomed the new innovation and evidenced a strong interest in educational change.

A year after this article was written, the authors published a book in which they list all their research methods. They attempted to collect data from a full variety of evidence--documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations--and link this data to their three propositions. This is a good example of an attempt at cross-validation of data by triangulation, using multiple sources of evidence from the same sample. In the article, however, they simply summarize their methodologies, so we have no way to judge the reliability of the data collection procedures.

An extensive body of data was collected on the basis of daily field observations conducted over nearly a seven month period, the examination of public and private documents, and informal and formal interviews with the teachers, their administrators, and other school personnel (p. 695). One of the key documents was an official paper sent to the teachers in November, 1966, presenting the new definition of the teacher's role. A summary of this document appears in the article. Formal interviews with all eleven teachers, averaging three hours in length, were carried out just prior to three weeks of intensive daily classroom observations, to assess the degree to which the innovation had been implemented. We do not know whether these interviews were informal conversational, guided, or standardized open-ended. However, we do know that all eleven teachers in the school were interviewed in depth, and that initially, four of them had negative reactions to the innovation. This seems to be at odds with Gross et al.'s initial ground rule, namely, that there should be buy-in across the board, prior to the implementation of the innovation.

The authors state that a high level of trust and rapport existed between the field worker and the faculty. They do not indicate how they cross-checked this data, since only one field worker acted as the data collector. We are told that this single field worker made repeated rounds each day to check all classes and to keep running records of the amount of time teachers devoted to performance in line with both the old and the new role model. The field worker conducted "in-depth systematic observations using an observation schedule of teacher performance in classrooms randomly selected for observation to guard against observer bias" (p. 696). However, from the information available in this article, we do not now what procedures were used to produce accurate records, nor how representative the data were. Nor do we know what official documents were read and cited besides the initial paper describing the new role of the teachers; whether the field worker taped and transcribed interviews verbatim; nor what form the in-depth systematic observations took.

Concerning the data analysis, we are told that "[a]nalysis of data collected...showed that the staff over-all during this period spent nearly 85 percent of the total time available to them in their classrooms behaving in accord with the old role model" (p. 696), and that the relatively small amount of innovative performance that was observed had serious deficiencies. One additional discrepancy is evident-though the authors say that daily field observations were conducted over a nearly seven month period, they only describe the observations that took place over a three week period in the spring of 1967. Thus, we do not know whether they are referring to the entire seven-month period during which the study took place, or just to a specific three-week period during which daily field observations took place. Clearly, a longer period of time would reveal the process of change more than just a short period of observations at the point when it was clear that the innovation had indeed failed.

After a short paragraph referring to their forthcoming book which would describe the data collection and analysis procedures, the authors present their findings. Basically, in the fall of 1966, their interviews revealed that "[a]ll teachers recognized and accepted the need for major educational innovations, and our field observations showed that they were using new types of instructional materials and that the administration was rewarding innovative behavior" (p. 695). Even though four of the eleven teachers had negative reactions to the innovation, all indicated that they were willing to make efforts to carry it out. Later, in May 1967, "[a]ll teachers were still behaving, for the most part, in accord with the traditional role model" (p. 696), they were devoting very little time trying to implement the innovation, and their performance was not commensurate with the new role model.

The researchers concluded that the implementation had failed, and then set out to interpret their findings. Obviously, since all teachers had been predisposed to implement the innovation, the explanation was not to be found in the traditional "resistance to change" theory base that was described in their literature review. Rather, the failure could be traced to "[a] set of unresolved problems or barriers to which they were exposed after they attempted to carry it out" (p. 696). This is a good example of explanation-building, which lends internal validity to the study, and which represents its strongest point.

The authors also state that the replies of one teacher to the formal and informal interviews were highly questionable, i.e., they had been informed by several of the other teachers that this participant was deliberately misinforming the field worker. There were serious discrepancies between the teacher's reported behavior and the actual observations made by the field worker. Thus, the Gross et al. have legitimately not chosen to present that participant's data.

Based on their collected data, they then infer that there were five types of unresolved problems or barriers that emerged from the case study, that led to the school's failure to adopt the innovation:

1. lack of clarity about the innovation that organizational members were being requested to implement;
2. lack of capabilities by members of the organization that are required to carry out the implementation;
3. lack of necessary tools and equipment to carry out the innovation, including lack of supplementary instructional materials that were intended to serve as "highly motivating self-instructional materials" for the teachers;
4. organizational conditions existing prior to and during the innovation's introduction that were incompatible with the innovation, including the rigid school schedule and the old system of giving traditional report cards to the students rather than evaluating their process of learning and the operational competencies involved (such as defining problems, organizing evidence, etc.), and
5. the performance of management in establishing the conditions that will permit subordinates to implement innovations, and in rewarding them for their efforts.

Here, the authors present good contextual data, with clear and vivid impressions, using verbatim quotations from the responses of ten of the eleven teachers, as well as describing details of the school setting. Barrier (1), lack of clarity of the innovation, is described in two notable responses from the interviews:

It's unclear in most ways; how are you supposed to get a new idea across to children when he [the Director] didn't want us to call children together; I am unclear as to my role (p. 697).

What is the teacher's role? Should she outline daily activities? Should she spur children on? Would the activity period be all or part of the day? (p. 697).

I never was able to instigate enthusiasm in these kids while keeping the noise level down, and I never knew how to get them to use their time for learning instead of playing (p. 698).

Barrier (3), lack of tools and equipment, was demonstrated by classroom observations that revealed that the self-instructional materials were never made available to teachers. Flash cards, Cuisinaire rods, and abacus, a typewriter, library books, crayons, water paint, and other normal school supplies were available, but they do not fit the description of the "highly motivating self-instructional materials" that were supposed to be part of the innovation. Curriculum materials and tutorials about instructional strategies that might have helped with the implementation of the innovation were conspicuously absent.

Barrier (4), prior organizational conditions that are incompatible with the innovation, was implicit in the school schedule and the report card system. Both are described in detail. The continuation of the school schedule, to which teachers were expected to adhere, blocked the teachers' effort to implement the innovation. The gap between the outmoded grading criteria and the ostensible purposes of the innovation resulted in increasing frustration by the teachers in their attempts to evaluate student learning outcomes.

Barrier (5), management influence, was described in the most detail, because it incorporated the previous four barriers. Here, the findings were mixed with interpretations, rather than being separate out. The first barrier cited was lack of clarity concerning the innovation itself. When asked why the barriers that the teachers encountered were never removed, "the evidence" (no specific evidence given) indicated that the nature of the new role requirements for teachers was ambiguous to the Director and the administrators; hence, the administrators did not clarify the teachers' role expectations. The second and third barriers--lack of capabilities and lack of tools and resources--could be explained by the failure of the administration to realize that the teachers "needed to be resocialized if they were to conform to the new definition of their role" (p. 700). Nor did the administrators provide adequate training for them to develop the necessary skills nor the time required to develop new instructional materials on the job. The fourth barrier, failure to make modifications in the organization to bring it into line with the innovation, was traced back to the administration's unawareness that existing organizational elements were incompatible with the implementation of the innovation, and the lack of commitment of key administrators to support the implementation process.

Next, the authors delve into the theoretical implications of their findings. The Director's strategy failed to take account of the difficulties which teachers would face as the implementation process proceeded, and made no prior provisions for mechanisms to identify and cope with unanticipated problems that might emerge during the implementation process. Moreover, communications between the Assistant Director and the Director broke down, and since and Assistant Director had reservations about the innovation, he did not conduct open and frank discussions with the staff either. The teachers, who were originally committed to the implementation of the innovation, did not see a concomitant commitment on the part of their superiors, who, in turn, did not provide effective mechanisms and decision-making procedures to cope with unanticipated problems that arose once the implementation process was well under way.

To me, this is an implication far in advance of its time. Coming from an organizational standpoint of the 1960s and 70s, where the systems approach had only been applied to management, I find it very interesting to see a systems approach--with its emphasis on clear communication channels and availability of information--now being applied to an instructional setting.

Another important implication is that the authors see the innovation as a process, not as a product. Resistance explanations generally deal with a lack of initial buy-in by key adopters, whereas here, the resistance developed over time among teachers who were originally predisposed to change. This is reminiscent of Bridges' (Managing Transitions, 1991) observation that the first task of change management is to understand the destination and how to get there. In the case of the Gross et al. study, the change that occurred between the adoption of the innovation and the end of the school year was this: though all teachers were initially willing to try to make the innovation work, by the end of the school year, they were no longer willing to do so. One quote from a spring 1967 interview portrays a teacher's feelings all too clearly:

The kids are getting really fresh now...Yesterday I had to go home and take two tranquilizers. The worst class is the second grade...;what one child said to me I couldn't repeat...I really hated coming to school today; I am sick of this place (p. 702).

1. the ability of members of the organization to implement an innovation will be directly correlated with the clarity of their understanding of the innovation;
2. a staff's ability to implement an innovation will be a function of its capacity to carry it out, including skills required to perform in accordance with its demands;
3. the ability to carry out its implementation will be a function of the tools and resources required by the innovation; and
4. organizational arrangements must be compatible with the innovation--i.e., if pre-existing organizational arrangements are not compatible with the innovation, and are not changed, then it will be more difficult to implement.
5. The extent to which these conditions are fulfilled will be a function of management: to clarify any confusion in the minds of the staff, to establish training programs and provide materials, to make changes in organizational arrangements, and to provide the types of incentives that will motivate staff members to expend the necessary time and effort for the implementation.

Basically, we have gone from a case study supported with data to a set of hypotheses that will require further testing beyond the bounds of the current study, i.e.:

If the implementation of an innovation is a function of the degree to which these five conditions are fulfilled, and if the extent to which these conditions are fulfilled is a consequence of management's performance, then the degree of implementation will be a function of the extent to which management fulfills these five conditions.

Finally, the authors deal with implications for further research, and suggest the need for reconceptualization of the change resistance model. First, the assumption that organizational members are resistant to change is not always true--here, teachers were initially willing to give it a try. Second, different strategies of implementation may be more or less effective, depending on the complexity of the innovation and the magnitude of the ensuing change. Third, further research needs to be done concerning how to deal with these five conditions prior to the innovation process; and, even if they are met at the beginning, problems of their maintenance must be considered as the implementation process progresses. Recent work by Melaville et al. (1993) deals with this area.

As cited in Fullan (1994), two other 1970-71 studies also dealt with failed implementations, but Gross et al. did not compare their results with those of the other researchers. A recent AECT paper (Teasley, 1996) dealt with this same issue and replicated Gross et al.'s results, namely, initial enthusiasm and implementation of computer use in the classroom died out after three years for lack of administrative support. Needless to say, we researchers who are evaluating the BVIP telecommunications program, also begin to see the handwriting on the wall...

The main limitation of the study is clearly spelled out by the authors--there was one case, so external validity is weak. The implications or generalizations drawn from a single case study, of course, must be taken with many grains of salt. We would have greater confidence in our conclusions if they had emerged from studies of both successful and unsuccessful efforts to implement organizational innovations (p. 704).

Another weak point of this paper is that it is necessary for an independent reviewer to read the book (published the year after the article was written) to verify results and draw his/her own conclusions. In my own experience publishing research reports in refereed journals, I have found that peer reviewers ask for sufficient information on methodology, to be followed up with either some representative quantitative data or a few verbatim quotes from interviews. Gross et al. have added some excellent, representative quotes, but have only described their methodology in the briefest of terms. Hence, when the article was written, the reader would not have had access to this information.

In general, this is an excellent, informative, and well-written paper that builds on the theory base available at the time. It attempts to develop a tentative, extended theory base from one representative case study, by looking at important variables that were overlooked by other researchers. What it lacks in description of research design and data collection, it more than makes up for in its excellent-and still current-explanatory theory. The authors' theory can not only describe, but can also predict the critical factors that may cause an educational innovation to succeed or fail.

References

Fullan, M. (1994). Change Forces. PA: Falmer Press.

Melaville, A., et al. (1993). Together We Can: A Guide for Crafting a Profamily System of Education and Human Services. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Rogers, E.M. (1983). Diffusion of Innovations (Third Edition). NY: The Free Press.

Teasley, U.H. (1996, February). Factors affecting teachers' decisions about use and non-use of computers: Administrative actions. Indianapolis: Paper presented at the AECT In-CITE'96 Conference.

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